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abstract: In this article, we consider the tension between unification and pluralism in biological theory. We begin with a consideration of historical efforts to establish a unified understanding of
evolution in the neo-Darwinian synthesis. The fragmentation of the
evolutionary synthesis by molecular evolution suggests the limitations of the general unificationist ideal for biology but not necessarily
for integrating explanations. In the second half of this article, we
defend a specific variety of pluralism that allows for the integration
required for explanations of complex phenomena without unification
on a large scale.
Keywords: integration, unification, pluralism, evolutionary synthesis,
molecular evolution.

Biology studies complex, developing, and evolving organisms and populations. Developing sea urchins, division of
labor in social insect colonies, and predator-prey interactions, for example, are all compositionally and dynamically complex. Their behavior depends on multiple levels
of organization and multiple causal components. Additionally, ever since Niko Tinbergen’s articulation of four
questions and Ernst Mayr’s distinction between ultimate
and proximate causes, there is general recognition of multiple levels of analysis (function, cause, development, evolution) or questions (why and how) that can be brought
to bear to explain a biological property or behavior. This
generates a plurality of models and explanations aiming
to get scientific traction on the “blooming buzzing confusion” that constitutes life (James 1911, p. 50). But how
are we to understand the pluralism of contemporary bi* E-mail: smitchel@pitt.edu.
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ological practice? Is it a mark of the immaturity of biological theory? Will today’s pluralism give way to a grand
unified theory of biology in the image of Newtonian physics? Or does pluralism indicate a healthy competition
among biologists about what is the singular true account
of why a system behaves the way it does? Or is it something
altogether different?
In this article, we will consider the tension between
unification and pluralism in biological theory. We begin
with a consideration of historical efforts to create unification in biology on a large scale through the neoDarwinian synthesis. The fragmentation of the evolutionary synthesis with the rise of molecular evolution suggests
the limitations of the unificationist ideal for biology. In
the second half of this article, we will defend a specific
variety of pluralism that allows for the integration required
for explanations of complex phenomena without unification on a large scale.

The Fragmentation of the Evolutionary Synthesis
Theodosius Dobzhansky’s well-worn declaration that
“nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of
evolution” was a testament to his faith in the unifying
power of the evolutionary synthesis (Dobzhansky 1973).
From the late 1930s, Dobzhansky, Ernst Mayr, and G. G.
Simpson organized a loose array of biologists interested
in evolution into members of a new discipline of evolutionary biology. The circumstances of this neo-Darwinian
or evolutionary synthesis are still a matter of debate among
historians, but certainly a unified understanding of the
foundational principles of evolutionary biology was the
goal of the synthesis’s architects (Smocovitis 1996). As
Dobzhansky put it, biology without evolution “becomes
a pile of sundry facts some of them interesting or curious
but making no meaningful picture as a whole” (Dobzhansky 1973, p. 125).
While historians rightly emphasize the disciplinebuilding work of getting paleontologists and geneticists to
communicate and agree about the processes of evolution,
the hallmark of the evolutionary synthesis in terms of

S74 The American Naturalist
biological theory was the developing consensus about the
primacy of natural selection (Provine 1988; Cain 1993;
Smocovitis 1996). The rising panselectionist belief that
natural selection was the most important mechanism of
evolutionary biology was dubbed the “hardening” of the
synthesis by Stephen Jay Gould (Gould 1983). A hardened
synthesis provided a foil for biologists’ intent of setting
themselves apart from the “evolutionary orthodoxy.”
While, in fact, there was never complete agreement among
evolutionary biologists about the importance and power
of natural selection, there was enough agreement to make
divergence from the perceived orthodoxy seem revolutionary. Motoo Kimura took advantage of these perceptions in his advocacy of the neutral theory of molecular
evolution, beginning in 1968 (Kimura 1968; Dietrich
1994).
As molecular biology rose in prominence in the 1960s,
molecular evolution emerged from the intersection of
fields such as evolutionary genetics, systematics, biochemistry, molecular biology, anthropology, and microbiology.
As biologists began to compare biochemical similarities
and differences in order to make evolutionary inferences,
they began to entertain the idea that not all molecular
changes had been subject to natural selection (Zuckerkandl
and Pauling 1965; Dietrich 1994). The possibility of neutral mutations had been previously posited by Dobzhansky
and others but was not taken seriously as an alternative
to natural selection (Dobzhansky 1955). When Motoo Kimura, Jack King, and Tom Jukes began to advocate the
importance of neutral mutations and random drift in 1968
and 1969, attitudes about drift and neutrality began to
shift (Kimura 1968; King and Jukes 1969). Many molecular
evolutionists with biochemical training were willing to accept neutral mutations on the basis of detected biochemical differences and molecular variability, but many biologists trained in evolutionary biology and steeped in the
evolutionary synthesis were much more skeptical (Dietrich
1998).
The controversy between the neutralists and selectionists that emerged in the 1970s and arguably continues to
this day is usually understood as pitting drift against selection. Even though the neutral theory includes a significant role for natural selection, it is perceived as opposing
panselectionism because it also advocates a significant role
for neutrality and drift at the molecular level. The juxtaposition of neutrality and panselectionism was beautifully captured by Alexey Kondrashov when he recently
wrote,
Once upon a time, the world seemed simple when viewed
through the eyes of evolutionary biologists. All genomes were
tightly controlled by various forms of natural selection. …
This idyllic world began to crumble in 1968, when Kimura

made his modest proposal that most allele substitutions and
polymorphisms do not substantially affect an organism’s fitness and are governed, not by positive or balancing selection,
but by random drift. (Kondrashov 2005, p. 1106)

While Kondrashov’s fractured fairy tale approach is compelling, the challenge of neutrality to panselectionism warrants more careful scrutiny.
First, Kimura, King, and Jukes initially encouraged this
idea of opposition. When King and Jukes titled their article
“Non-Darwinian Evolution,” they were deliberately trying
to set their work apart from that of the neo-Darwinian
synthesis. This oppositional approach certainly contributed to the polarization of the neutralist-selectionist controversy in the early 1970s. This sense of polarization extended beyond debates about the relative importance of
drift and selection to the place of molecular evolution
relative to evolutionary biology in general. While molecular biologists described evolutionary biology as oldfashioned and compared it to stamp collecting, evolutionary biologists attacked molecular biology as a fad and a
bandwagon. Molecular evolution arose right in the middle
of this larger turf war (Dietrich 1998; Hagen 1999). From
the first conferences on molecular evolution in 1962, molecular evolutionists such as Emile Zuckerkandl had been
clashing with architects of the synthesis, especially G. G.
Simpson. Zuckerkandl was interested in using molecular
comparisons to infer phylogenetic relationships. His advocacy with Linus Pauling of the molecular clock and his
disagreement with Simpson’s primate phylogeny drove a
wedge between molecular and morphological approaches
to evolution and systematics. When Kimura, Alan Wilson,
and others began to argue that the apparent constancy of
the molecular clock could be explained by the neutral
theory, the clock controversies became enmeshed with the
neutralist-selectionist controversies, and the split between
neutrality and selection became identified with a split between evolution as it occurred at the molecular and morphological levels (Dietrich 1998).
One of the most important outcomes of these early
controversies concerning molecular evolution was a division of the domain of evolutionary biology into molecular and morphological levels. Evolution at the molecular
level is marked by a significant role for random drift but
does not exclude natural selection. In contrast, evolution
at the morphological level is marked by the predominance
of natural selection. So in what sense did the rise of the
neutral theory of molecular evolution contribute to the
decline of panselectionism?
In order to answer this question, we need some analysis
of what constitutes panselectionism. We propose a threefold distinction that mirrors different forms of adaptationism proposed by Peter Godfrey Smith. Smith distin-
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guished empirical, methodological, and explanatory senses
of adaptationism in order to clarify both the claims and
disputes swirling about adaptationist approaches to evolution. When applied to panselectionism, three kinds of
panselectionist claims can be distinguished. First, empirical
panselectionism would claim that “natural selection is a
powerful and ubiquitous force, and there are few constraints, except general and obvious ones, on the biological
variation that fuels it.” Second, methodological panselectionism would assert that “the best way for scientists to
approach biological systems is to look for evidence of natural selection in some form.” Third, explanatory panselectionism would argue that explaining the effects of
selection is “the core intellectual mission of evolutionary
theory” (Godfrey Smith 2001, pp. 335–357).
With these distinctions in hand, we can now evaluate
the extent to which they make sense of the impact of
neutralism in evolutionary biology. The claim of empirical
panselectionism in its strongest form of advocating that
all molecular and morphological characters are the products of only selection was probably never held. That said,
at the height of the neutralist-selectionist controversy,
Christopher Wills mounted a defense of “naive panselectionism,” where he argued that “virtually any change in
amino acid composition of any protein molecule produces
a molecule of slightly different properties and therefore of
slightly different selective value from the original” (Wills
1973, p. 23). Wills’s defense of panselectionism did not
extend to the DNA sequences, where synonymous mutations were held as strong evidence that some nucleotide
substitutions were in fact neutral. As in many controversies
in biology, the empirical extent of neutrality and selection
is not an all-or-nothing affair but a matter of the relative
frequencies of each (Beatty 1987, 1995, 1997; Dietrich
2006). If some cases of neutrality are accepted, then the
strongest forms of empirical panselectionism can no longer
be defended.
The most significant impact of neutralism, however, is
methodological, not empirical. When Stephen Jay Gould
and Richard Lewontin launched their now famous attack
on adaptationism in “The Spandrels of San Marco and the
Panglossian Paradigm,” they argued broadly against panselectionism (Gould and Lewontin 1979). In his response,
Ernst Mayr defended adaptationism in methodological
terms. For Mayr, seeking adaptations was the best method
available because drift simply could not be detected (Mayr
1983). Undoubtedly, Mayr had in mind earlier debates
over whether drift could be detected at the morphological
level, while Gould and Lewontin were watching the rise
of molecular evolution as well as that of sociobiology
(Beatty 1987). While the early statistical tests of the neutral
theory were plagued with problems of low statistical power,
the introduction of DNA sequence information in the late
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1980s led to a series of statistical tests that could reliably
distinguish drift from selection at the molecular level
(Kreitman 1983; Hudson et al. 1987; Kreitman 2000).
Where selectionists’ hypotheses were once the starting
point and ending point of the research for virtually all
evolutionary biologists, by the 1990s the neutral theory
had become established as a null model and a starting
hypothesis for molecular evolution research (Crow 1987;
Kreitman 2000). This represents a significant methodological reversal. Even for biologists predisposed to favor
selectionists’ explanations, if they are using nucleotide sequence data, the neutral model is the starting place for
their investigation. Methodological panselectionism, then,
has been seriously undercut by the rise of neutral models
and sequence data.
Explanatory panselectionism may be the last refuge of
the ardent panselectionist. In declaring what the explanatory agenda of evolutionary biology ought to be, explanatory panselectionists assert, as Richard Dawkins has, that
adaptations constitute the business of evolutionary biologists (Dawkins 1983). While Dawkins may have empirical
reasons for making this claim, it solves the problem of
dealing with drift and neutrality only by dismissing it as
a legitimate object of explanation. This strategy of narrowing the domain of evolution to include only the processes and products of selection would certainly preserve
panselectionism, but at the cost of disregarding a significant portion of molecular evolution. As biology enters a
postgenomic era, it is hard to imagine biologists embracing
this alternative seriously.
The idyll of panselection has crumbled when given its
strongest formulations, but selection remains the predominant cause invoked in most biological explanations. The
inroads made against panselectionism are directed at molecular phenomena and techniques analyzing molecular
data. Insofar as evolutionary biology wishes to include
both molecular and morphological phenomena, it must
recognize that the domain of evolutionary explanations
has been significantly expanded with the advent of molecular biology. In his review of tests of neutrality and
selection, Martin Kreitman claims that “Kimura’s theory
of neutrally evolving mutations is the backbone for evolutionary analysis of DNA sequence variation and change”
because a “substantial fraction” of the genome is best modeled as selectively neutral, because selective neutrality is a
“useful null hypothesis,” and because “statistical analysis
of (potentially) neutral variation in a gene (or other region
of the genome) can be informative about selection acting
at linked sites” (Kreitman 2000, pp. 541–542). The empirical and methodological prominence of neutrality and
drift at the molecular level that Kreitman argues for indicates that the hardening of the evolutionary synthesis
was short-lived and inadequate. While the neutralist and
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selectionist positions have been refined into more nuanced
and complicated models in light of new evidence and ongoing debate, neither the nearly neutral models articulated
by Tomoko Ohta nor the fluctuating selection models articulated by John Gillespie, to cite just two examples, deny
a role to either drift or selection (Gillespie 1991; Ohta
2002). Rather than seek a new unifying theory of evolution,
however, current evolutionary biologists seem to accept
multiple causal processes and types of explanations offered
for evolutionary phenomena at the molecular and morphological levels. The result is explanatory and methodological pluralism in contemporary evolutionary biology.
Integrative Pluralism
As we have suggested, there is a long history of attempts
to impose unity upon the diversity that is found in biology.
It is our contention that though there is something to be
learned by adopting these unificationist approaches, they
do not account for the explanations that biologists seek.
In place of unification, we counsel pluralism. At first blush,
this would seem to invite disdain similar to Herschel’s
admonition of Darwin’s Origin of Species as the “law of
higgledy-piggledy” (Darwin letter to Lyell, 1837). But there
are other varieties of pluralism. What we defend here is
integrative pluralism, a view of the diversity of scientific
explanations that endorses close study and modeling of
different causes and different levels of organization but
calls for integration of the multiple accounts in the explanation of concrete phenomena.
Some explanations offered for a given phenomenon are
exclusive alternatives, of which at most one can be correct.
Consider, for example, alternative hypotheses about the
origin of an infectious disease that has been implicated in
the recent amphibian decline. Some have suggested that
the fungal pathogen Batrachochytrium dendrobatidi is endemic, while others say it is novel.
Emerging infectious diseases originate in two ways. The novel
pathogen hypothesis states that the pathogen (or a newly
evolved virulent strain of the pathogen) has recently spread
into a new geographic area, encountering naive host individuals or species that are highly susceptible to infection (Alford
2001). The endemic pathogen hypothesis suggests that it has
been present in the environment but has entered new host
species or increased in pathogenicity because of environmental
changes or, possibly, simply escaped previous human notice.
Strategies for disease management will differ substantially, depending on which of these hypotheses is correct (CDC 1994).
(Rachowitz et al. 2005, p. 1441)

It is clear that the logic of these hypotheses is one of
exclusion. They could not both be correct for the same
species or set of species at the same time. Only one can

capture the actual etiology, and tests to distinguish them
are needed to determine which of them is, in fact, correct.
Not only is our knowledge of population dynamics and
selection regimes enhanced by understanding whether a
pathogen is endemic or novel, but as the authors point
out, the answer makes a difference to the conservation
strategies that can successfully address the problem.
This structure of competing explanations driven from
exclusive hypotheses is common currency in the philosophy of science. Indeed, in an early articulation of scientific method, Francis Bacon ([1620] 1902) explored the
idea of an experimentum crucis where mutually exclusive
alternatives are set up, to be decided by experiment and
observation, and then as the finger post points in the
direction of the truth, the scientist follows, leaving behind
the defeated hypothesis and moving on to suggest further
alternatives among which tests of nature will decide.
It is well known that this type of inductive inference is
inconclusive, given that there are bound to be more alternative hypotheses than the two posed to be tested. Thus,
while one of the two posed may be logically refuted by
the observational evidence, the one left standing is not
thereby proven to be true. It may account for the test case
at hand but later be defeated in another bout with a third
alternative hypothesis. Indeed, the assumptions and interpretations required to generate observable tests of exclusive hypotheses themselves are implicated in the “refutation” of the losing side, and hence there is no guarantee
that the one inconsistent with a current observational test
might not be revived to fight again with the help of other
auxiliary assumptions. Thus, modern versions of the structure of competing explanations in science are more modest
in the conclusions that can be drawn by any experimental
test. They nevertheless account for alternative approaches
and explanations in terms of their competitive relation
and look into the future for the resolution to a single true
account. Take, for example, Kitcher’s (1990) endorsement
of a plurality of explanations in science. He argues that
because of our fallibility in determining which hypothesis
is true based on finite observational evidence, it is rational
to keep alternative competing accounts around. The aim,
though, is to ultimately resolve the conflict, or, in his
words, “the community goal is to arrive at universal acceptance of the true theory” (Kitcher 1990, p. 19). Thus,
while pluralism is acknowledged and even defended on
this approach, it is only as a means to a unified end.
While testing competing hypotheses does account for
some of the pluralism characterizing biological explanations, not all explanations compete. In the case of the
decline of amphibians, scientists have collectively explored
a number of possible alternative causes, including habitat
destruction, climate change, increasing levels of ultraviolet
radiation, environmental contamination, disease, and the
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introduction of nonnative species. Blaustein and Kiesecker
(2002) present the case that ecosystem complexity is responsible for the failure of consensus on which of these
is the cause or the most significant cause. They give evidence that multiple factors in interaction are responsible
for amphibian decline. Additionally, they claim that different constellations of causes in different contexts are
generating this effect. Thus, not only is it unlikely that one
cause is responsible for global decline, it is unlikely that
the same collection of causes is responsible for every case
of decline.
Thus, pluralism in the explanations of some feature of
the biological world might refer to competing hypotheses
(endemic vs. novel in a particular population) or multiple
contributing causes (climate change and disease acting
jointly) or multiple constellations of causes (climate
change and disease in one population and disease and
nonnative species in another) acting in different contexts
or at different times. There is little evidence to suggest
that any single causal factor typically accounts for the total
effect or that any successful causal explanation appealing
to one or many causal factors will account for all cases in
all contexts. Thus, any simple hypothesis will fail to generalize and thus fail to adequately explain similar effects
in all situations. Distinguishing among this plurality of
pluralisms, that is, competing hypotheses, partial causes,
and contingent causes, aids in determining where real conflict exists among different explanatory models and where
compatibility lies and integration is possible.
This situation is typical of evolved, dynamically robust
biological systems. The different hypotheses that scientists
propose to identify causes of an effect of interest are more
probably not solely determinant but rather contribute in
context-dependent ways to bring about the effect. But how
does one then study complex causality? A successful methodology has been decomposition (see Bechtel and Richardson 1992). That is, take a complex system, and investigate the subsystems that constitute it. Take the set of
potential causes, and investigate what power each of them
has individually in generating the effect. Thus, the nature
of the complexity of the systems studied by biology in
conjunction with a decomposition methodology necessitates a plurality of causal hypotheses that are not competing but compatible.
Biologists have long recognized the existence of compatible alternative explanations, and there have been attempts to partition the plurality in ways that locate areas
of compatibility and areas of competition. Tinbergen
(1963), in an influential article, outlined a four-part classification of questions one might ask of a biological phenomenon. More recently, Sherman (1988; see also Reeve
and Sherman 1993) revived this classification and dubbed
it “levels of analysis.” Biological questions are stratified
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into levels of evolutionary origin, current reproductive
function, ontogeny, and mechanism. Naturally, questions
at different levels require different answers. In some sense,
the questions are not addressing the same problem, and
hence, the answers given cannot be taken as competing.
As Sherman put it, “every hypothesis within biology is
subsumed within this framework; competition between
alternatives appropriately occurs within and not among
levels” (Sherman 1988, p. 616). But is this erotetic stratigraphy the right way to describe the relations among the
plurality of compatible explanations? Different levels of
analysis might target different partial causes, but will there
be no competition between levels? Different constellations
of partial causes at different levels may represent compatible harmony, but how on this framework does one
account for context contingency?
For example, explaining ontogenetically how a vertebrate limb develops by detailing the cell-cell interactions
that determine the axes upon which the limb is patterned
does not immediately implicate the fitness consequences
or the hormonal or genetic triggers for cell differentiation
and thus is in a sense autonomous from selectionist or
mechanism explanations. Yet, especially salient with the
increasing interest in evolutionary-developmental biology,
the relationship between evolutionary questions and developmental questions and the answers to them can no
longer be left in oblivious isolation. Answers to questions
posed at the different levels of analysis cannot be satisfactorily answered without consideration of the other levels. Evolution without development is empty, and development without evolution is blind (to butcher an old
Kantian chestnut). The pluralism of levels of analysis identifies strata in which explanations do not directly compete
with each other; however, an isolationist stance with regard
to these levels would be mistaken.
Competition does occur between hypotheses within a
level, but not only within those confines. Developmental
explanations suggest limits to the range of variability that
is and might have been available for selection to have acted
on. Fitness consequences of early developmental alternatives might constrain the range of subsequent developmental processes that are accessible. The relationship
among prima facie compatible alternative explanations
posed at different levels of analysis should be one not of
isolation but of integration. A consequence of such an
integrative strategy is the recognition of a new location
for competition among hypotheses. Which collection of
causal processes at all levels characterizes the etiology of
a targeted effect? What contribution does each potentially
contributing cause make? In different particular cases,
there will be different answers, but in any given case only
one answer will map onto the actual processes that brought
about the trait (Mitchell 2002, 2003). A “levels of analysis”
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framework recognizes the plurality of partial causes but
obscures rather than highlights the means of integrating
them.
Complexity, we have claimed, invokes multiple levels of
organization and multiple causal factors in generating an
effect. Evolved complexity introduces historical contingency, and ecological complexity introduces distributional
contingency into the mix. That is, how a complex organism
develops is in part a result of the particular evolutionary
trajectory its lineage traversed. There are alternative developmental schemas; which one is present in which individual may not result from physical or chemical necessity
but rather from its evolution. There are multiple mechanical triggers for behavior for a complex system. Which
ones are present and active may well be a function of the
ecological context in which the system is located. Explaining complex, evolved biological systems is not a “one-sizefits-all” enterprise.
Consider again the case of multiple causal contributors
to generating a complex effect. In the example of amphibian decline, the increase in UV radiation has been
implicated as a cause by means of its effect on hatching
success. Of course, it may be that the competing hypothesis, that UV radiation plays no role in amphibian decline,
may turn out to be correct. However, even if UV radiation
does causally contribute to amphibian decline, its effect is
not consistent across all species or taxa. Some populations
show marked decrease in hatchlings in the presence of
increased UV, but others show no decrease. When and
why does the effect vary? One suggestion (Blaustein and
Kiesecker 2002) is that UV radiation has different effects
when combined with other factors in a complex causal
network. It may, for example, be destructive only when
interacting with effects of acid rain or with other environmental pollutants. It may interact with biotic factors
such as the presence of other species that might participate
as disease vectors for the amphibian population.
By modeling each individual causal factor, one can discover its possible contribution to a complex effect. But
only by integrating multiple causes in multiple combinations can one begin to detect the actual causal history
leading to the decline of, say, western toads in Oregon as
compared with toads occurring in Colorado (Blaustein et
al. 1998). The developmental variations among amphibians may determine how various causal factors can interfere with phenotypic factors that contribute to fitness differences. At the molecular level of developmental regimes,
at the behavioral level sensitive to external context, various
causal processes are likely to be interacting to generate
variant fitness. A unified theory would promise that a
single type of causal factor (drift or selection) or at least
a single model of multiple causal factors (UV radiation
plus introduced species) would explain all the biological

phenomena we investigate. But contingency, context sensitivity, and nonlinear interaction among contributing
causes preclude the success of these types of unification.
The “levels of analysis” framework describes the territory
of pluralistic investigations, but it is only by integration
of the multiple levels and multiple causes, including attention to the diverse contexts in which they occur, that
satisfactory explanations can be generated.
Conclusion
The lure of a general and unified theory of evolutionary
biology was powerfully appealing to the founders of neoDarwinism. While we do not deny the appeal of this vision,
the expanding domain of evolutionary biology has complicated this supposed selectionist unification. Finding
ways to integrate molecular and phenotypic (i.e., morphological, physiological, and behavioral) levels represents
a new challenge for contemporary evolutionary biologists.
It is our contention that explanations of complex phenomena in biology regularly integrate phenomena across
levels. These integrative explanations result in a type of
pluralism that does not require general unification and
that explains why innovative and productive explanations
are possible in the absence of a unified theoretical framework.
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